An interesting post suggests that water rights transfers have been slow to develop because of the high transaction costs created by the “anticommons” nature of the water market. To summarize, the anticommons arises from exclusion rights – the right of one party to deny access to a common resource to another party. The theory is that excessive exclusion rights result in an inefficient allocation of resources. The notion of the tragedy of the anticommons is commonly invoked to discuss intellectual property development and inefficiencies that can arise from patent rights.
The authors of “Water Markets as a Tragedy of the Anticommons” argue that water transfers have not become commonplace because the inefficiencies of water rights as anticommons create transaction costs that discourage transfers. Although they make some excellent points, the basic argument is most persuasive in the case of commonly held rights such as irrigation districts. In those cases, the relationship between the end-user and the water supplier is a matter of contract, which can limit the user’s opportunities to transfer the right out of the district. If other shareholders can veto a water transfer, then it is reasonable to assume that the cost of the transfer could also include the cost of persuading the other shareholders to permit the transfer.
However, the argument is more tenuous with respect to groundwater irrigators. Unlike surface water diversion projects, wells are relatively cheap to drill and are a cost-efficient way for a single user to develop a water supply. Groundwater pumpers, accordingly, have not had to rely on cooperative projects and associations to develop their water, and their desired uses are therefore not limited by contract or by the veto rights of common owners.
The authors suggest that transactional costs are imposed by the “public interest” standard that is present in most water transfer statutes. Theoretically, that might be true; but as a practical matter, the likelihood that the “public interest” requirement will impede water transfers is small. Notably, the authors cite to only one incident in which a transfer application was actually denied on public interest grounds, and that denial was overturned on appeal. And it seems unlikely that transfers, say, from agricultural to municipal use, would be considered contrary to the public interest, particularly if there were a shortage or if development threatened to outstrip existing resources.
For groundwater pumpers, what discourages transfers is simply the “extent and validity” review that generally accompanies a water transfer. Pumpers know that certificated rights – paper rights – are nearly always reduced due to partial relinquishment. Return flows are also a big factor. Irrigation does not consume all of the water applied to the field; instead, some of the water returns to the source through surface runoff or percolation. Transferring agricultural water to, say, domestic supply, eliminates return flows and increases the amount of water that is consumed. In Washington, water administrators will correspondingly decrease the transferable right to account for the loss of return flows in order to ensure that the transfer does not impair existing rights. If the theory of the anticommons has any impact on groundwater transfers, it is here – in competing claims to return flows.
The end result is that agricultural to non-agricultural transfers are penalized because the cost of non-agricultural use is driven up. Consider this example: A farmer irrigates 100 acres of land to grow a crop that generates an average profit of $10/acre. Let’s assume that 20% of his water returns to the aquifer. A developer wants to buy the farmer’s 100-acre right. Let’s also assume that the fair market price for a water right is twenty years’ farming profits. In our example, the farmer’s water rights are worth $20,000 (disregarding, for convenience only, the present value of 20 years’ profits). After the return flow is subtracted, the farmer loses 100 acres of water right; however, the developer only gains 80 acres of water right. Although the farmer’s water right is worth $10/acre/year, the price the developer must pay is equivalent to valuing the water at $12.50/acre/year.
What this example illustrates is that while the anticommons may play some role in discouraging water transfers, the true economic disincentive is the simple reality that fully consumptive, non-agricultural uses cost more per unit of water than less consumptive, agricultural uses. If, as the authors suggest, water rights transfers are not very common, the logical reason is because the demand for reallocation is not high enough to justify the increased unit price. In other words, the problem with the authors’ analysis is the assumption that sufficient demand exists to make transfers economical. Yet the fact that transfers are uncommon demonstrates that demand for such transfers is low.
While it is interesting to consider how water as the anticommons affects the price of transfers, I strongly suspect that the real reason water rights are not transferred more frequently is a factor of basic economics – supply and demand. In reality, if there were an undeniable need for reallocation, no price would be too high.
*Update: Discussed on Aquanomics here. Need to follow up on the linked studies.